by Michael Coper
Now here is an alternative perspective:
Golf is a silly, trivial game, in which otherwise intelligent people chase a little white ball into a hole and then take it out and do it again. It has no socially or intellectually redeeming value, and is a self-indulgent distraction from higher and more worthwhile pursuits.
Which of these perspectives is the more apt?
The answer, I think, is that both, or all of the above, are apposite. It all depends on your point of view, your frame of reference. Descriptions like these, especially of things that might be understood in a physical or a metaphysical sense, are really just a part of a reductionist paradigm. They are models, ideal types, even caricatures, rather than realities. Complex phenomena, like our own personalities and characters, have many and often conflicting strands, the sum of which can never quite explain the elusive nature of the whole. And this is so even in relation to essentially descriptive tasks, let alone in relation to those more obviously involving patently subjective value judgments.
Yet, of course, value judgments underlie the most seemingly innocuous of descriptive tasks. Although neither example is innocuous, I chose the city of New York and the game of golf almost at random. I could have chosen judicial decision-making in the High Court. One description might emphasise the formal elements, the model of legalism, and the notion of the objective application or, in some cases, incremental extension, of pre-existing rules. Another description might emphasise the gaps in the rules, the role of judicial discretion, and the impact of values and policy considerations. Neither is true, and both are true. 4 In a swirling morass of legalism and realism, a whirlpool of formalism and pragmatism, all of the elements of judicial decision-making are sucked into the vortex of objective truth where they disappear without trace.
So it is with the notion of success and failure in the High Court. One person's success is another person's failure. To some, the cross-vesting cases Generally speaking, however, the Court just takes the cases that happen to come along.
At least the Court can now pick and choose amongst those cases and thus entirely determine its own docket, so I suppose we should congratulate the Court both on its behind-the-scenes lobbying that led to the 1984 amendments to the special leave provisions in the Judiciary Act and on its perhaps correspondingly unsurprising decision in 1991 upholding the validity of those amendments.
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But this is only the first step in any proactive plan to shape the law in Australia-the next is to use the selected cases not merely to resolve the disputes between the parties but also to lay down sweeping propositions of law to govern future disputes. On this score, in the view of some the Court has been altogether too successful, and I refer you in particular to the rather sharp and much-noticed views of rookie Justice Dyson Heydon Court's work, a two-way relationship which the authors of that entry noted 'awaits serious study '. 26 Habit number four is 'think "win-win"'. One would have to say here that the High Court has been a hopeless failure. One of the parties to cases before the Court always loses. Sometimes the Court uses its power to award costs to soften the impact of the loss, as in some classes of public interest litigation. Stephen Covey's sixth recommended habit is 'synergise'. Families should, he says, 'thrive on individual and family strengths so that, by respecting and valuing one another's differences, the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts'. in which the learned professor from Tulsa, Oklahoma, identifies his choice of the ten best and ten worst judges, and the ten best and worst decisions, of the United States Supreme Court. As we explain in our preface, ultimately we abandoned this exercise (and a retired Justice wrote to me to say how relieved he was that we had), for two reasons: first, precisely because of the elusiveness of the criteria, Moving on from the quasi-inductive approach to identifying the criteria for success and failure, the alternative approach is to attempt to frame those criteria in the abstract, and then apply them deductively to draw conclusions about particular successes and particular failures. This approach brings the issue of layers and levels into sharp relief. Are we talking about individual judges or the Court as an institution?
Are we taking a snapshot at a particular point in time, or considering a course of development over many years? Indeed, are we making a judgment in the context of a particular time, or looking back in the light of later development? 51 Are we looking at particular decisions, lines of decisions, or broad areas of law? Are we looking at process or outcomes? Do we think of a decision as a good one because its reasoning is elegant or because its result is socially or politically desirable? If the latter, how do we judge that? Is a decision a good one because it follows precedent or because it departs from precedent? And so on.
Like the centipede who never walked again after it started to think about how it managed to move so many legs at once, we do not want to be paralysingly introspective or to refine or qualify the question of success or failure out of existence.
So let me briefly mention the criteria that inevitably leap to mind when we start to think about judicial performance evaluation in general 52 and about evaluating the High Court and its justices in particular. Some of the criteria apply primarily to the justices, some to the courts as institutions, and some to both.
These criteria include efficiency; integrity, including independence and impartiality; enjoyment of public confidence; and calibre or capacity, temperament, and other desirable personal qualities. Yet each of these is a can of worms. Efficiency must accommodate giving the parties a fair hearing. If we really are to identify the criteria for success and failure in any serious way, I think we need to combine the two approaches I have outlined, the inductive and the deductive. 
